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ABSTRACT 
 
In this paper, we examine how inventory changes are related to the trading patterns of foreign 
and institutional investors, especially in firms with information asymmetry. Prior researchers 
report that inventory changes could be associated with firm performance, earnings 
management, stock returns, and incentive contracts. In this study, we focus on the relationship 
between trading patterns of informed traders and changes in inventory, testing how inventory 
changes are associated with the investment decision-making of informed traders. After 
controlling for firm-specific factors, we find a significant relationship between changes in 
inventory and trading patterns of institutional and foreign investors. Under conditions of high 
information asymmetry, the negative relation between institutional trading and inventory 
changes is enhanced. However, the amounts invested by foreign traders are negatively 
associated with increases in inventory even in firms with low information asymmetry. We infer 
that foreign traders exhibit more conservative trading patterns than institutional investors. 
 
Keywords: Information Asymmetry; Informed Trading Patterns; Inventory 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he informativeness of financial reports is an important issue in accounting. To improve comparability 
and informativeness of financial reports on a global scale, Korea adopted the IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards) in 2011. Inventory is an important item included in most financial 
reports. After the introduction of the Just in Time system, many firms chose to focus on inventory changes as part of 
their operations strategy. Information about inventory generally includes data regarding cost efficiency, earnings 
management, operations strategy, incentive contracts, and many other business strategies. Moreover, research on 
lean manufacturing has emphasized the reduction of inventory levels (e.g., Baiman et al., 2010). In this study, we 
focus on trading patterns of informed traders who have more precise information about inventory levels, and we test 
how inventory changes are associated with investment by informed traders according to the level of information 
asymmetry. 
 
 Early research on inventory (e.g., Baiman et al., 2010; Sun, 2010; Thomas and Zhang, 2002) emphasizes 
the effect of inventory changes on accruals, future stock returns, incentives in the form of compensation, 
profitability, and sales growth in firms. Baiman et al. (2010) provide analytic models of the relation between 
inventory buffers and performance metrics in incentive contracts for agents. According to Sun (2010), inventory 
changes in MD&A disclosures are associated with return on assets and sales growth in future periods. Thomas and 
Zhang (2002) also find that inventory changes affect the negative relation between accruals and future stock returns. 
Therefore, since the inventory level has been a critical factor for predicting future performance and interpreting 
current status of firms, we examine the effect of inventory changes on trading decision-making by informed traders. 
 
 Informed traders are generally distinguished between inside traders and outside informed traders. In this 
study, we define informed traders as outsiders such as institutional traders and foreign traders. Since informed 
T 
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traders of these two types play major roles in the Korean stock market and the information about each trading is 
provided on daily basis, an investigation of the trading patterns of institutional and foreign investors is an 
appropriate way to test the impact of inventory changes on informed trading (Choe et al., 2005). Compared to 
domestic institutional traders, foreign traders based on their expertise may be able to realize more returns (Grinblatt 
and Keloharju, 2000). However, foreign traders have limited access to local information about firm performance and 
tend to be less informed than domestic informed traders (Brennan and Cao, 1997). If foreign traders are less 
informed than domestic traders, they may prefer to avoid investment risk and behave more conservatively than their 
more sophisticated, better-informed domestic counterparts. Thus, we predict that if foreign traders have advantages 
in terms of trading over domestic informed traders, foreign traders may reflect the information of inventory changes 
and timely respond to the level of inventory. On the other hand, if foreign traders have a disadvantage compared to 
domestic traders because of information asymmetry, foreign traders may reflect the lagged information of inventory 
changes and react conservatively to time-lag inventory changes in order to avoid investment risk. 
 
To test the association between inventory changes and the trading activities of informed investors, we 
examine changes in the amount of informed trading. We also analyze information asymmetry in each firm through 
the ratio of bid-ask spreads, which is utilized as a proxy for investment risk in stock trading. When firms experience 
high levels of information asymmetry, the effect of inventory changes on informed traders’ decision-making tends to 
be enhanced because informed traders are better able to evaluate investment risk in each company and reflect this 
information in their investment decisions. In such cases, we can infer that information asymmetry may have 
informativeness for informed investors in interpreting the meaning of inventory changes made by firms. 
 
 After controlling for firm-specific factors, we find that inventory changes are associated with changes in 
the amount of foreign and institutional trading. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the negative relation between 
institutional trading and the change in inventory is enhanced when firms experience high level of information 
asymmetry. Institutional traders are likely to reflect timely information about the current changes in inventory and 
reduce buying and selling when firms with information asymmetry increase their current inventory. When we 
consider the abnormal inventory in our model, we find that institutional traders also reduce buying when abnormal 
inventory increases in firms with information asymmetry. However, although trading of foreign traders is associated 
with increase in current inventory, the effect of information asymmetry is insignificant. In the model including 
abnormal inventory, a negative relationship is observed between amounts invested by foreign investors and previous 
abnormal inventory, and the effect of information asymmetry is also insignificant. From these results, stakeholders 
in the capital market can learn about the influence of changes in inventory in firms with information asymmetry on 
informed trading patterns. Also, these results indicate that inventory changes can be informative for informed 
traders, who tend to respond to current or previous changes in inventory and reflect this information in their 
decision-making according to the level of information asymmetry in each firm. We also find that the decisions of 
informed traders reflect abnormalities in inventory during current or previous periods. Taken together, we infer from 
the results that inventory changes have informativeness in the capital market, but that foreign traders show more 
conservative trading patterns than institutional traders because the former unconditionally reduce trading amounts in 
accordance with current or previous inventory increases even in firms with low levels of information asymmetry. 
 
 This study adds to the existing literature on the relationship between informed trading and inventory 
changes by providing additional evidence of this relationship in firms with information asymmetry. Unlike previous 
studies, we focus on informed trading patterns, demonstrating a significant association between inventory increases 
and informed trading. We find that sophisticated traders are eager to respond to informative items in financial 
reports regarding their investment decisions. Further, we show that foreign traders tend to behave in a more 
conservative manner than domestic informed investors. Also, we provide evidence that domestic traders respond to 
inventory changes according to the level of information asymmetry in a given firm. From this study, capital market 
participants may also improve their understanding of the informativeness of current inventory with regard to 
investment risk. 
 
 The rest of this paper is organized into five sections. The second section provides the study background and 
develops the hypotheses. The third section discusses the research method and data selection procedures. The fourth 
section presents our empirical results, and the last section concludes the study. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Inventory 
 
 The traditional view of inventory is that raw materials, work in process, and finished goods of resalable or 
realizable value are categorized as inventory for the purposes of reporting the financial status of firms. Prior studies 
on inventory (Jiambalvo, 1997; Roychowdhury, 2006; Sun, 2010; Thomas and Zhang, 2002) emphasize the effect of 
inventory changes on abnormal stock returns, accruals, earnings management, profitability, and sales growth in 
firms. Jiambalvo (1997) suggests the following variable for measuring inventory changes: the change in the percent 
of production added to inventory (CPAI), examining the effect of overproduction on abnormal stock returns. By 
allocating some of their current fixed manufacturing overhead costs to inventory, managers are able to manipulate 
net income caused by excess production. In this case, firms can record earnings surprise in their financial reports 
only for the current period. The long-term effects of increases in CPAI on stock prices are insignificant (Jiambalvo, 
1997). Roychowdhury (2006) also suggests another type of inventory: abnormal inventory. Observing production 
costs with abnormal inventory and abnormal COGS (cost of goods sold), we see that managers who want to 
manipulate earnings tend to reduce production costs by stimulating overproduction. However, this phenomenon is 
less prevalent when investors are well informed. Sun (2010) shows a positive association between favorable 
explanations for inventory changes in MD&A disclosure and return on assets and sales growth in future periods. 
Thomas and Zhang (2002) also find an effect of inventory changes on the negative relation between accruals and 
future stock returns. Therefore, since inventory is clearly critical for predicting future performance and interpreting 
current financial status, we examine the effect of inventory changes on trading decisions made by informed traders. 
 
  Baiman et al. (2010) provide an analytic model of the relation between the inventory buffer and the 
performance metric in incentive contracts for agents. If an agent is compensated based on realized throughput (e.g., 
output per unit of time), the inventory buffer is affected by that agent’s incentive and optimal compensation. The 
results of that study suggest that decreases in inventory buffer are efficient only when reducing the inventory buffer 
intensifies the informativeness of the performance scheme. Many studies in economics, accounting, and operations 
management focus on inventory changes because the effects of these changes are associated with current and future 
earnings, stock prices, managers’ opportunistic behaviors, and compensation structures. Unlike in prior studies, in 
this study we investigate informed trading patterns and inventory changes in firms with information asymmetry. 
Informed traders are able to evaluate inventory changes differentially, collect more precise information, and respond 
more sensitively to changes in the level of information asymmetry in each firm than uninformed outsiders. Thus, we 
test trading patterns of informed traders and changes in investment decision-making as related to inventory changes 
in firms with information asymmetry. 
 
Information Asymmetry 
 
 Easley and O’Hara (2004) report that information asymmetry is related to the cost of capital. In addition, 
information asymmetry affects firm value. Copeland and Galai (1983) suggest an analytic model in which a positive 
effect of bid-ask spreads on market price and return variance is implied. Since high bid-ask spreads are associated 
with high information asymmetry (Chae, 2005), we utilize bid-ask spreads to test the relation between inventory 
changes and informed trading under conditions of information asymmetry. According to our prediction, informed 
traders tend to recognize the level of information asymmetry and reduce trading amounts correspondingly in order to 
avoid investment risk. 
 
When inventory changes are due to the increase of customer orders, informed traders will increase trading. 
On the other hand, inventory changes may imply bad news about firms, indicating earnings management or 
opportunistic behavior on the part of managers. In such cases, informed traders may reduce trading in firms with 
increased inventory. Also, the characteristics of informed traders may vary. Some may be at a disadvantage in 
utilizing information about inventory and may therefore behave more conservatively than other informed traders. To 
test the relation between informed trading and inventory changes, we present our first hypothesis, as follows: 
 
H1: Changes in inventory are associated with buying and selling patterns of foreign or institutional traders. 
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Informed traders are regarded as sophisticated investors who can collect precise and useful information in 
order to record high returns. If informed traders recognize the level of investment asymmetry in firms, then they 
may only decrease trading amounts in firms with increased inventory and high investment risk. This argument leads 
to our second hypothesis. 
 
H2: Changes in inventory in firms with information asymmetry are associated with reduced buying and selling 
patterns of foreign or institutional traders. 
 
 In addition, when we utilize abnormal inventory changes, we can rule out trends in inventory changes due 
to variations in customer ordering and the effects of management strategy, operations strategies of peer companies, 
or global economic issues. Including abnormal inventory, we present the third and fourth hypotheses: 
 
H3: Abnormal inventory is associated with buying and selling patterns of foreign or institutional traders. 
 
H4: Abnormal inventory in firms with information asymmetry are associated with reduced buying and selling 
patterns of foreign or institutional traders. 
 
 If the results show a significant relation between inventory changes and trading patterns of foreign and 
institutional traders, we can show the incremental effects of information asymmetry on inventory changes and 
informed trading patterns. 
 
III. RESEARCH METHODS AND DATA SELECTION 
 
 To determine how inventory changes are associated with the trading patterns of informed traders, we 
employ variables representing inventory changes, the amount of institutional and foreign trading, an indicator for 
information asymmetry, and interaction terms among inventory changes and information asymmetry. To measure 
inventory changes, we utilize the measure developed by Jiambolvo et al. (1997) and Roychowdhury (2006). For the 
level of information asymmetry, we use the ratio of bid-ask spreads, which can be considered a proxy for 
information asymmetry and investment risk (Chae, 2005; Copeland and Galai, 1983). 
  
The Change In The Percent Of Production Added To Inventory 
 
 Jiambalvo et al. (1997) suggest that the change in the percent of production added to inventory (CPAI) is 
appropriate as an indicator for overproduction in firms. Since CPAI reflects the change in the ratio between 
producing and selling amounts, increases in CPAI only related to reducing production costs through overproduction 
are easily captured by the ratio. When we utilize CPAI in our test model, the effects of overproduction on inventory 
for earnings manipulation are readily compared. CPAI is computed in equation (1) according to the method of 
Jiambalvo et al. (1997). 
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where 
 
CPAI = the change in the percent of production added to inventory in year t for firm i; 
QP = the quantity produced in year t for firm i; 
QS = the quantity sold in year t for firm i; 
∆Inv = the difference between inventory in year t and in year t − 1 for firm i; and 
COGS = the cost of goods sold in year t for firm i. 
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Abnormal Inventory 
 
The CPAI measure has the advantage of matching the effect of overproduction. However, trends in 
inventory may change due to variations in customer ordering and the effects of operations strategies or global 
economic issues. These factors are rarely controlled in models including CPAI. Therefore, in order to control for 
these factors, we employ another method involving abnormal inventory. We utilize the normal inventory growth 
model as suggested in Roychowdhury (2006). In this model, firms with high residual value correspond to firms with 
high abnormal inventory. Since residuals are calculated using estimation errors, we compute each firm's residuals 
within each industry in year clusters. Residuals for abnormal inventory are calculated using equation (2), as in 
Roychowdhury (2006). 
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where 
 
∆Inv = the difference between inventory in year t and in year t − 1 for firm i; 
A = the total assets in year t − 1 for firm i; 
∆S = the difference between sales in year t and year t − 1 for firm i; and 
Abnormal inventory = the estimated residuals from model (2). 
 
Spreads 
 
We categorize firms with high levels of information asymmetry as follows. Firms with top quartile ranked 
spreads correspond to firms with high information asymmetry. Since spreads are based on daily trading data, we 
sum up the difference between the daily bid and the ask price. Yearly stock spreads are computed as in equation (3). 
The mean of daily spreads is utilized for the yearly spread ratio. 
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where 
 
SPREAD = the difference between the daily bid and ask price on day t for firm i; 
ask = the daily ask price for firm i; and 
bid = the daily bid price for firm i. 
 
Research Model 
  
 As in prior studies (e.g., Jiambalvo, 1997; Roychowdhury, 2006; Sun, 2010; Thomas and Zhang, 2002), in 
this study we expect that inventory changes and information asymmetry influence firm performance and the trading 
patterns of informed traders. The following model, equations (4) and (5), is used to test the four hypotheses: 
 
Inst _ Absv
it
= b
0
+b
1
IA
it
+b
2
pCPAI
it
+b
3
pCPAI * IA
it
+b
4
CPAI
it
+b
5
CPAI * IA
it
(or Netv,Buyv,Sellv)
it
+b
6
SIZE
it
+b
7
BM
it
+b
8
RET
it
+b
9
STD
it
+b
10
For _Buyv
it
+ IND&YEAR +å eit .
 (4) 
 
For _ Absv
it
= b
0
+b
1
IA
it
+b
2
pCPAI
it
+b
3
pCPAI * IA
it
+b
4
CPAI
it
+b
5
CPAI * IA
it
(or Netv,Buyv,Sellv)
it
+b
6
SIZE
it
+b
7
BM
it
+b
8
RET
it
+b
9
STD
it
+b
10
Inst _ Buyv
it
+ IND&YEAR +å eit . (5)
 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2015 Volume 31, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 706 The Clute Institute 
where 
 
definitions of variables provided in Table 8. 
 
As in prior studies (Cohen et al., 2012; Smith and Watts, 1992; Choe et al., 2005; Watanabe, 2008), in this 
study we expect that firms with lower book to market values, higher returns, and greater volatility are likely to have 
more information asymmetry and stronger reactions from informed traders. 
 
 Based on prior research, several control variables are added. SIZE may reflect the effects of omitted 
variables on the investment environment (Cohen et al., 2012). BM is also important, implying that if firms have 
growth options and a low BM, then investors cannot avoid information asymmetry (Smith and Watts, 1992). We 
also add RET and STD because stock returns and stock volatility tend to influence informed trading volumes 
(Watanabe, 2008). To measure STD, yearly stock volatility is computed based on the mean difference between daily 
low and high prices scaled by the mean stock price. In addition, heterogeneous informed traders are affected by 
other informed trading, and foreign traders sometimes respond to the behaviors of domestic investors (Choe, 2005). 
Therefore, in order to control for heterogeneity in the relative effects among informed traders, we employ For_Buyv 
in model (4) and Inst_Buyv in model (5). In this study, we compute each firm's ratio from each industry in year 
clusters in order to adjust for industrial and periodic effects. 
 
Table 1: Sample Descriptions 
Panel A. Sample Selection Criteria 2008–2010   
 
 Observations 
All firm-year observations from the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE)  2,340 
(Less) Financial service  (258) 
(Less) Firm-year observations with insufficient financial data  (329) 
(Less) Firm-year observations with insufficient trading data  (41) 
(Less) Firm-year observations with negative equity  (3) 
Final Sample Size  1,709 
 
Panel B. Sample by Year 
  Final Sample 
Year  Firm_Year % 
2008  560 32.77 
2009  566 33.12 
2010  583 34.11 
Total  1,709 100 
 
Panel C. Sample by Industry 
  Final Sample 
Industry  Firm_Year % 
Electronic Components and Precision Instruments   166 9.71 
Cokes, Medicinal, Non-metallic, Metal, and Chemical Products  554 32.42 
Motor Vehicles and Transportation Products  118 6.90 
Other Manufacturing  347 20.30 
Construction Activities  90 5.27 
Information and Communication Service Activities  54 3.16 
Retail, Wholesale, Other service, and Other activities  380 22.24 
Total  1,709 100 
 
Data Selection 
 
Table 1 presents the sample used in this study. Because the global financial crisis started in 2007, leading 
to a global recession from 2008–2012, and mandatory adoption of the IFRS (International Financial Reporting 
Standards) has been in effect in Korea from 2011, the test period in this study extends from 2008 to 2010. We 
exclude firm-year observations in financial service industries, firms with insufficient financial and trading data, and 
those with negative equity. Panels B and C of Table 1 provide distributions in each year and industry, indicating that 
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clusters by year and industry are not a serious concern. Financial data were extracted from the KIS-VALUE
1
 
database by the NICE Information Service, and trading data were extracted from the Fn-guide database
2
 by 
FnGuide, Inc. Bid and ask spreads were extracted from the Bloomberg database. Korean trading data may be useful 
to compare the behavior of sophisticated domestic investors (institutional traders) with that of foreign traders 
because foreign traders must register with the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS) and use their ID number for 
trading stocks (Choe et al., 2005). 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the dependent, independent, and control variables. In this study, we 
use winsorized values for continuous variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles in order to control the effects of 
extreme observations. The mean value of the total trading ratio by institutional investors (Inst_Absv) is 0.0512, and 
the absolute trading value is the change in the sum of buying and selling amounts in between the test period and the 
previous year, scaled by market value.
3
 The mean value of the net trading ratio (Inst_Netv, −0.0113) is similar to the 
net trading amounts by buying less than selling amounts of institutional traders (Inst_Buyv, 0.0300 and Inst_Sellv, 
0.0414). For_Absv has a mean value of 0.0397, and the mean value of For_Netv is 0.0129, which is the net amount 
of stock buying and selling by foreign investors (For_Buyv, 0.0294 and For_Sellv, 0.0188). While the average value 
of For_Netv is positive, the average value of Inst_Netv is negative. This indicates that foreign traders may deposit 
more money in Korean stocks than domestic institutional traders in this test sample. The binary variable for the 
firms with high levels of information asymmetry (IA) is 0.2411, which refers to top-quartile ranked firms in our 
sample. Regarding the level of information asymmetry, firms with high levels of quoted stock spreads ratio over the 
top quartile have a value of 1, and a value of 0 is allocated to other firms in our final sample. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables 
(N=1,709) 
             
 MEAN  STD  Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
Inst_Absv  0.0512  0.4090  −0.9853  −0.0987  0.0000  0.0938  1.5545 
Inst_Netv  −0.0113  0.1935  −0.7303  −0.0700  −0.0001  0.0417  0.6164 
Inst_Buyv  0.0300  0.2634  −0.6343  −0.0597  0.0000  0.0390  1.1359 
Inst_Sellv  0.0414  0.2638  −0.5931  −0.0422  0.0000  0.0640  1.1268 
For_Absv  0.0397  0.3580  −0.8569  −0.1129  0.0000  0.1394  1.2799 
For_Netv  0.0129  0.1387  −0.4768  −0.0226  0.0009  0.0471  0.5106 
For_buyv  0.0294  0.2137  −0.5047  −0.0515  0.0000  0.0768  0.8327 
For_Sellv  0.0188  0.2244  −0.5920  −0.0620  0.0000  0.0707  0.8297 
IA  0.2411  0.4279  0  0  0  0  1 
pCPAI  0.0090  0.1073  −0.1463  −0.0034  −0.0002  0.0007  0.9607 
CPAI  −0.0012  0.1871  −1.0000  −0.0295  0.0004  0.0288  1.0023 
pAbn_Inv  −0.0009  0.9613  −2.5758  −0.4842  −0.0528  0.4241  2.9594 
Abn_Inv  −0.0010  0.9674  −2.6699  −0.4905  −0.0390  0.3988  3.0887 
SIZE  26.5017  1.4733  23.9915  25.4346  26.1973  27.3109  30.7195 
BM  1.5232  1.0570  0.1465  0.7459  1.2764  1.9971  5.5665 
RET  0.0061  0.0258  −0.0518  −0.0109  0.0056  0.0225  0.0730 
STD  −0.0090  0.0396  −0.1107  −0.0346  −0.0080  0.0164  0.0905 
Definitions of variables provided in Table 8. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The KIS-VALUE database in Korea provides both financial and stock market data for firms listed on the Korea Stock Exchange and KOSDAQ 
markets, which are equivalent to COMPUSTAT and CRSP in the U.S. 
2 The FnGuide database includes informed trading information, and is equivalent to the I/B/E/S. 
3 To avoid endogeneity issues, we compute all dependent variables, Inst_Absv, Inst_Netv, Inst_Buyv, Inst_Sellv, For_Absv, For_Netv, For_Buyv, 
and For_Sellv, using the difference in trading amounts scaled by market value between the test year and the previous year. 
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Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables used in the empirical analyses. The highest 
correlation of continuous dependent variables is about 0.55, which is between For_Buyv and RET
4
 in the analysis 
model (3). The remaining variables are not highly correlated. The highest VIF value in the regression analyses is 
below 0.97 and the condition index (not tabulated) is low, indicating that multicollinearity is not a serious concern.
5
 
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Variables 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. Inst_Absv −0.02 0.93 0.94 0.54 −0.02 0.50 0.51 −0.05 0.00 −0.04 −0.01 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.44 0.04 
 
*** *** ***  *** *** *  *   ** ** ***  
2. Inst_Netv 1 0.29 −0.31 −0.04 −0.23 −0.11 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 0.03 0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.05 0.00 −0.01 
 
*** ***  *** ***        *   
3. Inst_Buyv  1 0.77 0.51 −0.08 0.45 0.51 −0.04 −0.01 −0.03 −0.01 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.42 0.02 
  
*** *** *** *** ***      ** *** ***  
4. Inst_Sellv   1 0.51 0.06 0.50 0.47 −0.03 0.00 −0.05 −0.01 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.41 0.03 
   
*** ** *** ***   **   ***  ***  
5. For_Absv    1 −0.04 0.95 0.96 −0.03 −0.03 −0.07 −0.03 −0.01 0.02 0.07 0.56 0.06 
    
* *** ***   ***    *** *** ** 
6. For_Netv     1 0.24 −0.29 −0.02 0.00 0.02 −0.04 0.05 0.08 −0.02 0.04 0.00 
    
 *** ***     * ***  *  
7. For_buyv      1 0.83 −0.02 −0.03 −0.06 −0.05 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.55 0.06 
      
***   ** *   ** *** *** 
8. For_Sellv       1 −0.02 −0.03 −0.07 −0.02 −0.02 0.00 0.07 0.51 0.06 
      
   ***    *** *** ** 
9. IA        1 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 −0.12 −0.09 −0.02 
       
     *** *** ***  
10. pCPAI         1 −0.33 −0.10 0.06 0.06 −0.01 −0.05 0.02 
         
*** *** ** ***  *  
11. CPAI          1 −0.22 0.16 −0.03 −0.02 −0.02 −0.06 
          
*** ***    ** 
12. pAbn_Inv           1 −0.21 0.02 0.03 −0.01 0.02 
           
***     
13. Abn_Inv            1 0.03 −0.01 −0.02 0.01 
                
14. SIZE             1 −0.12 −0.01 −0.04 
            
 ***  * 
15. BM              1 0.34 −0.17 
             
 *** *** 
16. RET               1 −0.35 
              
 *** 
17. STD 
               
1 
 
Regression Results: the Change in the Percent of Production added to Inventory 
 
 Table 4 provides the empirical results of multivariate regressions for testing two of the hypotheses. The 
Inst_Absv model shows the relation between the change in inventory (CPAI) and absolute total trading amounts of 
institutional investors. CPAI*IA is significant and negatively associated with Inst_Absv at a significance level of 1 
percent. When firms have high levels of information asymmetry based on bid-ask spreads, institutional investors are 
likely to avoid risk and reduce stock trading amounts for firms with increases in inventory. Since total assets in 
many firms will be increased due to the increased inventory, informed traders may respond positively to their 
expanded assets. Generally, when firms prepare for growing customer orders, they expand their inventory in terms 
of work in process, materials, or finished goods. However, some firms may hold the goods or materials 
opportunistically in order to reduce the cost of goods sold during some fiscal periods. This will cause a reduction of 
earnings in the near future. If informed traders want to reduce investment risk as sophisticated investors, they may 
react differentially to increases in inventory according to the level of information asymmetry in each firm. 
                                                 
4 Dropping either For_Buyv or Inst_Buyv in models (4) and (5) does not change our conclusion and yields qualitatively identical results. 
5 To mitigate the heteroscedasticity problem, heteroscedasticity-consistent estimators are used as in White (1980). The Durbin-Watson test does 
not provide statistical evidence of autocorrelation in our regression models (not tabulated). 
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Consistent with this conjecture, institutional investors also reduce net amounts (Inst_Netv), buying (Inst_Buyv), and 
selling amounts (Inst_Sellv) when firms with information asymmetry increase the level of inventory. As for buying 
patterns, institutional traders increase buying amounts in proportion to increased inventory in firms with low 
information asymmetry, but buying amounts are reduced more in firms with high information asymmetry. The 
coefficient of CPAI*IA in the Inst_Buyv model is negative, and the absolute value of this coefficient is greater than 
the positive coefficient of CPAI. This result indicates that the more firms with information asymmetry expand their 
current inventory, the more institutional traders reduce buying amounts compared to the previous period. 
 
When we include the previous change in inventory (pCPAI), there are insignificant additional effects on 
trading patterns of institutional investors. This result indicates that institutional traders are likely to reflect timely 
information about current changes in inventory rather than previous changes. 
 
The coefficients for several control variables are significant. The variable of BM is negatively associated 
with institutional trading patterns, since investors prefer growing firms which record low values of BM. Consistent 
with the results for BM, the variable of RET and STD are positively related to the trading patterns of informed 
traders (Chae, 2005; Watanabe, 2008). 
 
Table 4: Informed Traders and Inventory Changes in Firms with Information Asymmetry – Institutional Traders 
 
Variables 
 Inst_Absv  Inst_Netv  Inst_Buyv  Inst_Sellv  
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 
Intercept  −0.4623 −2.80 *** 0.0467 0.50  −0.2447 −2.19 ** −0.3754 −3.51 *** 
IA  −0.0106 −0.54  0.0016 0.14  −0.0012 −0.09  −0.0033 −0.26  
pCPAI  0.1165 1.25 
 −0.0322 −0.81  0.0674 1.15  0.0855 1.46  
pCPAI*IA  −0.2385 −1.12  −0.0134 −0.16 
  −0.1335 −1.00  −0.1663 −1.28  
CPAI  0.0578 1.27 
 0.0359 1.43  0.0557 1.90 * 0.0166 0.56  
CPAI*IA  −0.3667 −3.73 *** −0.0853 −1.99 ** −0.2601 −4.11 *** −0.1709 −2.71 *** 
SIZE  0.0168 2.77 
*** −0.0025 −0.75  0.0084 2.06 ** 0.0144 3.67 *** 
BM  −0.0117 −1.32  0.0045 0.85  −0.0047 −0.76 
 −0.0127 −2.22 ** 
RET  6.1278 10.36 
*** 0.5503 1.84 * 4.0294 10.21 *** 3.3769 8.89 *** 
STD  0.7310 2.58 
** 0.3164 1.90 * 0.3985 2.18 ** 0.3048 1.59  
For_Buyv  0.6171 9.04 
*** −0.1436 −3.54 *** 0.3387 7.40 *** 0.4392 9.70 *** 
IND/YEAR  Included   Included  Included  Included 
 
F-value  44.78 
***  2.33 ***  36.79 ***  42.50 ***  
Adj R square  0.3157  
 
0.0139 
 
0.2739  0.3043 
 
Max VIF  0.26   0.87  0.45  0.58  
N  1,709   1,709  1,709 
 
1,709 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Definitions of variables provided in Table 8. 
 
In Table 5, we provide the results for the trading patterns of foreign traders using the change in the percent 
of production added to inventory for the current and previous inventory (CPAI and pCPAI). The For_Absv model 
represents the association between CPAI and pCPAI and absolute total trading amounts by foreigners. Using the 
For_Sellv model, we examine how the change in inventory is related to foreign investors’ behavior. In both the 
For_Absv and For_Sellv models, the coefficient of CPAI is negative and significant. This indicates that foreign 
traders tend to reduce selling amounts according to current increases in inventory, but that buying amounts are not 
associated with CPAI. Consistent with Brennan and Cao (1997), this result shows that foreign investors have a 
tendency to avoid investment risk and to behave more conservatively when they are at an information disadvantage 
than domestic traders. 
 
The relation between the previous change in the percent of inventory (pCPAI) and the change in trading 
amounts of foreigners is insignificant. From this result, we can infer that foreign traders tend to reflect timely 
changes in inventory rather than previous changes. However, we fail to find additional effects of information 
asymmetry on the trading patterns of foreign investors. 
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Regarding control variables, BM is negatively associated with foreign trading patterns, which 
demonstrates that firms with high growth options due to low BM attract foreign investors that prefer growing firms. 
In accordance with the results for BM, the variables for RET and STD are positively related to the trading patterns of 
informed traders (Chae, 2005; Watanabe, 2008). 
 
Table 5: Informed Traders and Inventory Changes in Firms with Information Asymmetry – Foreign Traders 
 
Variables 
 For_Absv  For_Netv  For_Buyv  For_Sellv  
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 
Intercept  0.0447 0.31 −0.2257 −3.27 *** −0.0236 −0.27  0.1353 1.46  
IA  0.0104 0.68 −0.0072 −0.90  0.0073 0.77  0.0100 1.01 
 
pCPAI  −0.0809 −1.31 0.0027 0.12  −0.0535 −1.37  −0.0485 −1.29  
pCPAI*IA  0.0196 0.20 
 
0.0584 0.94   0.0564 0.81  −0.0244 −0.45  
 
CPAI  −0.0865 −2.06 ** 0.0285 2.12 ** −0.0372 −1.52  −0.0642 −2.43 ** 
CPAI*IA  0.0353 0.45 
 −0.0386 −1.34   −0.0019 −0.04  0.0557 1.12   
SIZE  0.0020 0.38 
 0.0089 3.50 *** 0.0032 1.02  −0.0032 −0.97  
BM  −0.0411 −5.73 *** −0.0044 −1.19  −0.0252 −5.73 
*** −0.0228 −4.82 *** 
RET  6.1260 12.33 
*** 0.9346 4.08 *** 4.0179 13.22 *** 3.1575 9.34 *** 
STD  2.8883 11.01 
*** −0.0160 −0.14  1.7166 10.50 *** 1.6596 9.70 *** 
Inst_Buyv  0.3821 10.72 
*** −0.0746 −2.95 *** 0.1727 7.64 *** 0.2697 10.73 *** 
IND/YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
F-value  87.63 
***  3.11 ***  74.76 ***  70.94 ***  
Adj R square  0.4773 
 
0.0217 
 
0.4374  0.4243 
 
Max VIF  0.84  0.90  0.97  0.65  
N  1,709  1,709  1,709 
 
1,709 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Definitions of variables provided in Table 8. 
 
Regression Results: Abnormal Inventory 
 
 Table 6 includes the results of testing of the third and fourth hypotheses about institutional traders and 
abnormal inventory. In this model, we use abnormal changes in the current and the previous inventory (Abn_Inv and 
pAbn_Inv). Roychowdhury (2006) suggests a modified model for detecting abnormal increases or decreases in 
inventory. Using this model, we can statistically determine the abnormal status of inventory in each firm. If a firm 
has increased inventory in terms of CPAI and pCPAI, a trend toward increasing customer orders and inflation of raw 
materials may be included in increased CPAI and pCPAI during specific periods. When we use abnormal values for 
the change in inventory, we can exclude other factors affecting the trend in inventory changes. 
 
After controlling for these trend-related factors, we find that buying amounts by institutional traders 
(Inst_Buyv) are negatively related to increases in Abn_Inv in firms with information asymmetry. This result also 
shows that these factors (Abn_Inv*IA) influence the total amounts of buying and selling by institutional traders 
(Inst_Absv). 
 
Consistent with the results for CPAI, institutional traders are likely to respond to information about current 
abnormal changes in inventory (Abn_Inv), especially when making their buying decisions. 
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Table 6: Informed Traders and Inventory Changes in Firms with Information Asymmetry – Institutional Traders 
 
Variables 
 Inst_Absv  Inst_Netv  Inst_Buyv  Inst_Sellv  
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 
Intercept  −0.4496 −2.71 *** 0.0542 0.58 −0.2361 −2.10 ** −0.3672 −3.42 *** 
IA  −0.0117 −0.60  0.0018 0.16 −0.0017 −0.13  −0.0044 −0.35 
 
pAbn_Inv  0.0033 0.35 
 0.0005 0.09 0.0013 0.22  0.0037 0.60  
pAbn_Inv*IA  0.0094 0.45  
 −0.0060 −0.53  0.0078 0.57   0.0017 0.13   
Abn_Inv  0.0165 1.66 
* 0.0017 0.31 0.0110 1.60  0.0085 1.38  
Abn_Inv*IA  −0.0458 −2.20 ** −0.0127 −1.07  −0.0317 −2.40 ** −0.0221 −1.64   
SIZE  0.0164 2.69 
*** −0.0029 −0.85 0.0082 1.98 ** 0.0142 3.61 *** 
BM  −0.0103 −1.16  0.0044 0.84  −0.0037 −0.60 
 −0.0120 −2.11 ** 
RET  6.0276 10.18 
*** 0.5405 1.82 * 3.9623 10.05 *** 3.3253 8.76 *** 
STD  0.7007 2.47 
** 0.2978 1.77 * 0.3746 2.04 ** 0.2918 1.52  
For_Buyv  0.6215 9.05 
*** −0.1436 −3.55 *** 0.3412 7.41 *** 0.4418 9.70 *** 
IND/YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
F-value  44.3 
***  2.21 ***  36.32 ***  42.15 ***  
Adj R square  0.3134 
 
0.0126 
 
0.2713  0.3025 
 
Max VIF  0.73  0.93  0.83  0.90  
N  1,709  1,709  1,709 
 
1,709 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Definitions of variables provided in Table 8. 
 
The For_Absv model in Table 7 shows that foreign traders tend to increase net trading amounts when 
abnormal inventory (Abn_Inv) is higher, as in Table 5 with CPAI. However, insignificant relations are found 
between trading patterns of foreign investors and abnormal changes in inventory in firms with information 
asymmetry. Moreover, buying patterns are only related to previous abnormal inventory, not current abnormal 
inventory. 
 
In summary, we predict that trading patterns of informed traders are likely to reflect informative changes 
in inventory. We find that institutional traders consider timely information about current changes in inventory rather 
than previous changes. Institutional investors tend to reduce buying and selling amounts when firms with 
information asymmetry expand their current inventory. This tendency is also evident in the model including 
abnormal inventory. In detail, institutional traders reduce buying amounts when abnormal inventory is high in firms 
with information asymmetry. However, trading amounts by foreign traders are only associated with current changes 
in inventory, and the effect of information asymmetry is insignificant. When we include abnormal inventory in the 
regression model, buying amounts by foreign investors are negatively related to previous abnormal inventory, and 
the effect of information asymmetry is insignificant, as in the regression model including CPAI. As in Brennan and 
Cao (1997), increased inventory could be bad news to foreigners regardless of information asymmetry because 
foreign investors may be at an information disadvantage and therefore avoid investment risk more than domestic 
traders. This result suggests that changes in inventory are informative for informed traders. This phenomenon is 
more clearly observed in the behavior of institutional traders when firms experience information asymmetry, which 
measured by the high ratio of bid-ask spreads. 
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Table 7: Informed Traders and Inventory Changes in Firms with Information Asymmetry – Foreign Traders 
 
Variables 
 For_Absv  For_Netv  For_Buyv  For_Sellv  
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 Coeff. 
White t 
value 
 
Intercept  0.0314 0.22 −0.2236 −3.24 *** −0.0329 −0.37 0.1290 1.40 
IA  0.0109 0.72 −0.0062 −0.79  0.0082 0.88 
 
0.0097 0.99 
pAbn_Inv  −0.0098 −1.30 −0.0029 −0.72  −0.0084 −1.79 * −0.0032 −0.66 
pAbn_Inv*IA  −0.0078 −0.45  −0.0062 −0.71   −0.0045 −0.41   −0.0060 −0.56  
Abn_Inv  −0.0047 −0.59 0.0073 1.72 * −0.0004 −0.07  −0.0061 −1.25 
Abn_Inv*IA  0.0012 0.08  −0.0067 −0.79   −0.0007 −0.07   0.0039 0.39  
SIZE  0.0024 0.46 0.0088 3.47 
*** 0.0035 1.11  −0.0031 −0.92  
BM  −0.0407 −5.69 *** −0.0041 −1.12  −0.0247 −5.68 
*** −0.0228 −4.83 *** 
RET  6.1284 12.36 
*** 0.9257 4.07 *** 4.0125 13.25 *** 3.1698 9.41 *** 
STD  2.9129 11.14 
*** −0.0285 −0.25  1.7275 10.61 *** 1.6775 9.82 *** 
Inst_Buyv  0.3824 10.70 
*** −0.0745 −2.96 *** 0.1732 7.68 *** 0.2695 10.69 *** 
IND/YEAR  Included  Included  Included  Included 
 
F-value  87.43 
***  3.27 ***  74.96 ***  70.55 ***  
Adj R square  0.4767 
 
0.0233 
 
0.438  0.423 
 
Max VIF  0.94  0.80  0.94  0.69  
N  1,709  1,709  1,709 
 
1,709 
 
Notes: ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
Definitions of variables provided in Table 8. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 In this study, we examine how changes in inventory are associated with the trading patterns of foreign and 
institutional investors. To test how these changes are related to the activities of informed traders, we utilize changes 
in the amount of informed trading. We also include the information environment in our regression analyses. Firms 
with different levels of information asymmetry, which is treated as a proxy for investment risk associated with stock 
trading, are examined in the analyses. After controlling for firm-specific factors, we show evidence that changes in 
inventory are associated with changes in the amount of foreign and institutional trading. Furthermore, we 
demonstrate an enhanced relation between institutional trading activities and changes in inventory when firms 
experience high levels of information asymmetry, as measured by the ratio of bid-ask spreads. This result indicates 
that inventory changes can be informative for informed traders. Informed traders tend to respond to changes in 
inventory and to reflect this information according to the level of information asymmetry in each firm. Moreover, 
we find that informed traders consider abnormal inventory during the current or previous periods, and that foreign 
traders show more conservative trading patterns than domestic institutional investors. From the results of this study, 
stakeholders in the capital market may improve their understanding of the relation between informed trading 
patterns and inventory changes in firms with information asymmetry. 
 
 This study adds to the existing informed trading and inventory literature by providing additional evidence 
of the relation between changes in inventory and informed trading in firms with investment risk. This study may also 
help capital market participants to improve their understanding of the informativeness of inventory in such firms. 
Future research may focus on the effects of various characteristics of investment risk and other types of informed 
trading activities in firms with different operations strategies. 
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Table 8: Definitions of Variables 
Inst_Absv = the natural log of changes in absolute total trading amounts by institutional traders scaled by market value between 
year t and year t − 1; 
Inst_Netv = the natural log of changes in net buying amounts by institutional traders scaled by market value between year t and 
year t − 1; 
Inst_Buyv = the natural log of changes in stock purchase amounts by institutional traders scaled by market value between year t 
and year t − 1; 
Inst_Sellv = the natural log of changes in stock selling amounts by institutional traders scaled by market value between year t 
and year t − 1; 
For_Absv = the natural log of changes in absolute total trading amounts by foreign traders scaled by market value between year 
t and year t − 1; 
For_Netv = the natural log of changes in net buying amounts by foreign traders scaled by market value between year t and year 
t − 1; 
For_Buyv = the natural log of changes in stock purchase amounts by foreign traders scaled by market value between year t and 
year t − 1; 
For_Sellv = the natural log of changes in stock selling amounts by foreign traders scaled by market value between year t and 
year t − 1; 
IA = 1 if a firm has a high level of information asymmetry, and 0 otherwise; 
pCPAI = the previous value of an estimate of the change in the percent of production added to inventory; 
pAbn_Inv = instead of pCPAI, the previous value of the abnormal inventory from equation (3), for testing the third and fourth 
hypotheses; 
CPAI = the current estimate of the change in the percent of production added to inventory; 
Abn_Inv = instead of CPAI, the current value of abnormal inventory from equation (3) for testing the third and fourth 
hypotheses; 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets at the beginning; 
BM = the ratio of equity scaled by market value at the beginning; 
RET = the accumulated value of daily stock returns during a given period; 
STD = the yearly change in stock volatility from daily low and high prices scaled by the mean value of stock prices; and 
IND & YEAR = dummies representing each industry and year. 
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